Unconventional Negotiation: Survey and New Directions by Sim, Kwang Mong
Association for Information Systems 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) 
ICEB 2009 Proceedings International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) 
Winter 12-4-2009 
Unconventional Negotiation: Survey and New Directions 
Kwang Mong Sim 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/iceb2009 
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) at AIS Electronic 
Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEB 2009 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS 
Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org. 
The 9th International Conference on Electronic Business, Macau, November 30 - December 4, 2009 
UNCONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATION: SURVEY AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
 
Kwang Mong Sim 
Department of Information and Communications, Gwangju Institute of Science and 
Technology, South Korea.  
E-mail: kmsim@gist.ac.kr http://www.infcom.gist.ac.kr/~kmsim/MAS/ 
 
Abstract 
The increasing demand for building large-scale 
complex and distributed systems such as Cloud/Grid 
computing systems accentuates the need for complex 
negotiation mechanisms for managing computing 
resources. The contribution of this paper includes: 1) 
summarizing classical negotiation problems and 
conventional negotiation in terms of the utility 
function, strategy, and protocol, 2) discussing the 
differences between conventional negotiation and 
unconventional negotiation, 3) reviewing and 
comparing the state-of-the-art developments in both 
relaxed-criteria negotiation, and complex and 
concurrent negotiation, and 4) suggesting new 




Negotiation denotes the process of two or more 
agents (with disparate interests) searching for an 
agreement on some issues (e.g., price) [1]. The 
search process involves exchange of information, 
relaxation of initial goals, and mutual concessions.  
Automated negotiation among distributed systems 
(e.g., multi-agent systems and software agents) is 
becoming increasingly important because automated 
interactions among software agents can occur in 
many different contexts in which conflicts and 
differences need to be resolved. For instance, 
e-negotiation is a desirable mechanism for resolving 
differences in trading terms in e-commerce and 
supply chain management, and more recently for 
resource (co-)allocation in Grid computing. Research 
on engineering e-negotiation agents has received a 
great deal of attention in recent years.  
   The contribution of this paper includes: 1) 
summarizing classical negotiation problems, and 
conventional negotiation in terms of the utility 
function, strategy and protocol,  2) reviewing and 
comparing the state-of-the-art developments in 
unconventional negotiation such as relaxed-criteria 
negotiation, and complex and concurrent negotiation, 
3) discussing the differences between conventional 
negotiation and unconventional negotiation, and 4) 
suggesting new directions in concurrent negotiation 




In the literature in bargaining (negotiation), the 
seminal works of Nash [2], and Rubinstein and 
Osborne [3-4] established the essential frameworks 
and foundations of bargaining theory.  
Bargaining Problem: In [3], a bargaining problem 
is specified as follows. There is a set of N bargainers 
(players or agents). The negotiation outcomes are: 1) 
agents reaching an agreement or 2) negotiation 
terminating with a conflict D. Each agent has a 
negotiation set or agreement set A (see [3, p. 9]), 
which represents the space of its possible deals or 
proposals for reaching agreements with its opponent, 
and the agent has a preference ordering over the set 
A∪D. There is a utility function U for each agent that 
represents its preference ordering by associating each 
negotiation outcome with a number, such that more 
preferred outcomes are associated with larger 
numbers.  
 Utility function: An agreement may take many 
forms. It can be a price or a detailed contract that 
specifies the actions to be taken by agents [3]. In 
classical bargaining problems involving price-only 
negotiation between two agents B and S [3], the 
utility function UB of B is defined as follows. Let IPB 
and RPB be the initial and reserve prices of B. Let D 
be the event in which B fails to reach an agreement 
with its opponent. UB:[IPB,RPB] ∪D→[0,1] such that 
UB(D)=0 and for any lB∈[IPB,RPB],UB(lB)>UB(D). 
Furthermore, if B is a buyer (consumer) agent, then  
1 2( ) ( )B BB BU l U l>  if 1 2B Bl l< . If S is a seller 
(provider) agent, then 1 2( ) ( )S SS SU l U l< if 
1 2
S Sl l<  
such that for any lS∈[IPS,RPS], US(lS)>US(D). 
Negotiation strategy: If B and its opponent S are 
sensitive to time, then let Bτ be the deadline of B, and 
Sτ , IPS and  RPS  be the deadline, initial price, and 
reserve price of S. In a one-to-one negotiation, the 
only factor affecting both agents is their deadline. In 
[5-7], B and S adopt time-dependent strategies. Let 
λB and λS be the time-dependent strategies of B and S, 
respectively. The proposal BtP  of B at time 
,0 Bt t τ≤ ≤ , is determined as follows: 
( ) ( )BBt B B B
B
tP IP RP IPλ
τ
= + −                   (4) 
where 0≤λB≤∞, and IPB and RPB are B’s initial price 
and reserve price, respectively. 
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The proposal StP  of S at time ,0 St t τ≤ ≤  is 
determined as follows: 
( ) ( )SSt S S S
S
tP IP IP RPλ
τ
= − −                   (5) 
where 0≤λS≤∞, IPS and RPS are S’s initial price and 
reserve price, respectively. 
Negotiation protocol: Negotiation between B and 
S is carried out using the Rubinstein’s 
alternating-offers protocol [4] as follows. B makes 
an offer at t = 0, 2, 4, 6, … S makes a counter offer at 
t = 1, 3, 5, 7, … During negotiation, B (respectively, 
S) uses eq. (4) (respectively, eq. (5)) to generate an 
offer (respectively, a counter-offer).  Negotiation 
terminates (i) when an agreement is reached, or (ii) 
with a conflict when either B’s or S’s deadline is 
reached.  
  Optimizing utility: The problem is to find a value 
of λB (respectively, λS) that would optimize  UB 
(respectively, US) given different parameters (e.g., 
deadline, initial price, and reserve price). 
 
Conventional Negotiation vs. 
Unconventional Negotiation 
In this paper, conventional negotiation [1-8] 
approaches are identified with the following 
characteristics: 
1. An agreement is reached when one agent 
proposes a deal that matches (or exceeds) 
what another agent asks for. 
2. Agents focus only on optimizing utilities.  
3. When contracts are established, agents are 
bound to them (i.e., no agent can breach a 
contract). 
4. Agents negotiate with other agent(s) for one 
type of goods/service in only one market. 
  Agreements and utilities: In conventional 
negotiation, agents evaluate (counter-)proposals 
using some utility function U(P) and typically accept 
a proposal P based on whether the opponent's 
proposal generates an expected payoff that is equal to 
or higher than some expected payoff. For example, if 
agent B1’s proposal P1B generates a payoff of U(P1B), 
B1 will typically accept another agent S1’s 
(counter-)proposal P1S only if it generates  a payoff 
U(P1S), such that U(P1S)≥U(P1B).  Since agents in 
conventional negotiation mechanisms are 
utility-maximizing agents, they are not designed with 
the flexibility to consider reaching a faster agreement 
by accepting P1S if U(P1S)<U(P1B) even if the 
difference  |U(P1S)-U(P1B)| is (very) small. In 
multi-lateral negotiation, an agent may run the risk of 
losing deals in the face of strong competition. The 
idea of relaxed-criteria negotiation proposed by Sim 
[9] redefines the notion of reaching a consensus in 
negotiation by allowing agents to overlook very 
small differences in their proposals, and hence, 
slightly relaxing the conditions for reaching 
agreements. Unlike conventional negotiation where 
agents only strive to optimize their utilities, in 
relaxed-criteria negotiation, agents attempt to 
enhance their success rates in negotiation and to 
reach faster agreements while also attempting to 
optimize their utilities. 
Contracts: In conventional negotiation, an agent is 
bound to a contract once it is established (i.e., neither 
party can breach the contract). In unconventional 
negotiation, Sandholm et al. [10] proposed the idea 
of leveled commitment contracts for a two-player 
game, where each player can be freed from a contract 
by paying a penalty fee to the other player, and the 
level of commitment is set by breach penalties. 
Allowing decommitments enables an agent to 
profitably accommodate new negotiation events that 
make some old contracts unbeneficial. This enables 
an agent to take on unbeneficial contracts in 
anticipation of better contracts in subsequent 
negotiations.  For example, in Grid resource 
negotiation, the reasons for allowing decommitments 
are as follows: 1) if a consumer cannot acquire ALL 
its required resources before its deadline, it can 
release those resources acquired so that resource 
providers can assign them to other consumers, and 2) 
decommitment allows an agent that has already 
reached an intermediate contract for a resource to 
continue to search for better deals before the 
termination of the entire concurrent negotiation.    
Markets: In conventional negotiation, regardless of 
the number of agents (participants), (i.e., whether it 
is a one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many 
negotiations), agents negotiate for only one type of 
goods/service within one market. A recent work by 
Sim et al. [11] considered a complex concurrent 
negotiation mechanism in which an agent conducts 
simultaneous and parallel negotiation activities with 
agents in multiple e-markets for acquiring multiple 
types of resources. 
 
Relaxed-criteria Negotiation 
In Sim’s relaxed-criteria negotiation [9], two rules 
were defined for allowing agents to reach 
agreements: 
  R1: An agreement is reached if an agent B1 and its 
opponent S1 propose deals P1B and P1S, respectively, 
such that either 1) U(P1B)≥U(P1S) or 2) 
U(P1S)≥U(P1B), where P1B and P1S represent the 
buying and selling prices, respectively. 
R2: An agreement is reached if either 1) η= 
U(P1S)–U(P1B), such that η→0 or 2) η= 
U(P1B)–U(P1S), such that η→0, where η is the 
amount of relaxation determined using a fuzzy 
decision controller (FDC) together with a set of 
relaxation criteria. 
In conventional negotiation, agents follow 
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Rubinstein’s alternating-offers protocol and only use 
R1 for determining whether an agreement is reached. 
In Sim’s relaxed-criteria negotiation protocol, agents 
use both R1 and R2 for determining whether an 
agreement is reached.   
Sim’s relaxed-criteria negotiation is generally 
designed for many-to-many negotiation, and agents 
are programmed to slightly relax their bargaining 
terms in the face of intense pressure (e.g., urgent 
need to acquire a resource, or facing fast approaching 
deadlines). Since notions such as “very slight” 
difference in proposals, “strong” competition, and 
“fast” approaching deadline are vague, an FDC 
together with a set of 16 fuzzy rules were used in [9] 
to guide agents in making decisions when relaxing 
their aspirations. In relaxing its bargaining terms, an 
agent in [9] is influenced by factors such as degree of 
competition (ϑ ) and its eagerness (ε). ε represents 
how urgent it is for an agent to acquire a resource 
before a deadline [9]. An agent that is more 
(respectively, less) eager to reach a consensus will be 
more likely to overlook small differences between its 
proposal and its opponents’ counter-proposals. Both 
ϑ  and ε are the relaxation criteria and they form the 
antecedents of the fuzzy rules. The amount of 
relaxation η is the consequent of a fuzzy rule. 
Whereas ϑ  and ε are the inputs to the FDC, η 
represents the amount that an agent would relax its 
bargaining terms in a given situation (the output of 
the FDC). 
In [12], the idea of relaxed-criteria negotiation was 
generalized by augmenting the designs of negotiation 
agents with additional fuzzy controllers to allow even 
more flexibility in negotiation. In [12], agents can 
both 1) raise their expectations in extremely 
favorable markets and 2) lower expectations in 
extremely unfavorable markets (i.e., relaxing their 
bargaining criteria). In relaxing their bargaining 
criteria, agents in [12] use the same set of relaxation 
criteria (degree of competition and eagerness) as 
agents in [9]. In raising their expectations, agents 
face two challenging decisions: 1) whether to 
postpone reaching consensus and 2) duration to 
postpone deal. In very favorable market conditions, 
an agent B1 may receive (>1) proposals O={ P1S,…, 
P1S} from its opponents S1,…,Sk that are better than 
or equal to its own proposal P1B, such that 
U(PjS)≥U(P1B), ∀PjS∈O. Hence, B1 may postpone its 
decision to reach a consensus with an opponent in the 
hope that it can achieve a higher utility than U(P1B). 
However, in multi-lateral negotiation, if B1 postpones 
its decision to reach a consensus, it also runs the risk 
of not completing the deal with any of its opponents 
eventually. Hence, B1’s decision to postpone a deal 
depends on the number of agents Na with a proposal 
that is better than or equal to its own proposal. If Na 
is a sufficiently large number, then it would be 
advantageous for B1 to postpone its deal. However, 
B1 needs to determine how large Na should be for a 
given market condition. For different market 
situations, Na is determined by the degree of 
competition (ϑ ) that B1 faces and its eagerness (ε) to 
acquire a resource/service. If B1 is very eager to 
acquire an urgently needed resource or faces very 
strong competition, it may not postpone the deal if Na 
is not much larger than 1. Bothϑ and ε collectively 
form the antecedent of the fuzzy rules of an FDC 
(called FDC1 in [12]) for determining Na. If B1 
decides to postpone its decision to reach a deal, it has 
to decide the duration Tp for postponing the deal.   
Two factors that affect Tp are the fraction of 
remaining trading time Tr=(τ-t)/τ (where τ is the 
deadline and t is the current round) and Na. Both Na 
and Tr collectively form the antecedent of the fuzzy 
rules of an FDC (called FDC2 in [12]) for 
determining Tp.  
Whereas slightly lowering expectation may 
increase the probability of reaching consensus in 
adverse market conditions, slightly raising 
expectation may enhance the utilities of agents in 
extremely good (albeit, rare) market situations. 
Stochastic simulations in [12] demonstrated that 
agents in [12] following the generalized 
relaxed-criteria negotiation protocol achieved 1) 
higher average utilities than agents in [9] following 
the relaxed-criteria protocol and 2) higher success 
rates than agents in [13-14] following 
alternating-offers protocol (i.e., agents that do not 
relax their bargaining terms nor raise their 
expectations). 
Subsequently, the work in [9] was adapted to 
automated negotiation in Grid resource management. 
In Sim’s relaxed-criteria G-negotiation protocol 
[15-16], agents representing resource providers and 
consumers are programmed to slightly relax their 
bargaining criteria under intense pressure (e.g., when 
a consumer has a higher demand for resources) with 
the hope of enhancing their chance of successfully 
acquiring resources. A consumer agent and a 
provider agent are both designed with an FDC: 
FDC-C and FDC-P, respectively. Two different sets 
of relaxation criteria (for consumers and providers, 
respectively) that are specific to Grid resource 
management are used as inputs to FDC-C and 
FDC-P, respectively.  
  Two criteria that can influence a consumer agent’s 
decision in the amount of relaxation of bargaining 
terms are: 1) recent statistics in failing/succeeding in 
acquiring resources called failure to success ratio (fst) 
and 2) demand for computing resources called 
demand factor (dft). If a consumer agent is less 
successful in acquiring resources recently to execute 
its set of tasks, it will be under more pressure to 
slightly relax its bargaining criteria with the hope of 
completing a deal. If a consumer agent has a greater 
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demand for computing resources it is more likely to 
be under more pressure to slightly relax its 
bargaining criteria. Both fst and dft are inputs to 
FDC-C, and the output is η (the amount of relaxation) 
[15-16].  
  Two criteria that can influence a provider agent’s 
decision are: 1) the amount of the provider’s 
resource(s) being utilized (the utilization level (ult)) 
and 2) recent resource requests from consumers (the 
request factor (rft)). If more of its resources are 
currently being utilized or are occupied, then a 
provider is less likely to slightly relax its bargaining 
terms. If there are fewer recent demands from 
consumers for resources, a provider is more likely to 
slightly relax its bargaining criteria since it is under 
more pressure to lease out its idle resources. Both ult 
and rft are inputs to FDC-P, and the output is η 
[15-16]. 
    The fuzzy rules for FDC-C and FDC-P in 
[15-16] and the FDC in [9] were manually generated, 
and agents in [9] and [15-16] negotiate in only one 
market. In [17], relaxed-criteria negotiation agents 
were designed to negotiate in more than one 
e-market and with the capability to continuously 
enhance their performance by evolving their fuzzy 
rules as they negotiate in more e-markets. Like 
agents in [9, 15-16], agents in [17] also follow Sim’s 
relaxed-criteria negotiation protocol. Whereas there 
are two inputs to FDC-C and FDC-P in [15-16] and 
the FDC in [9], there are three inputs to the FDC in 
[17]. The three inputs corresponding to the set of 
relaxation-criteria are: 1) time pressure, 2) degree of 
competition, and 3) the relative distances from the 
opponents’ proposals. When an agent’s deadline is 
fast approaching, an agent is under more (time) 
pressure to relax its bargaining criteria. Hence, at the 
start of negotiation, an agent is less likely to overlook 
small differences in proposals. Like agents in [9], an 
agent in [17] that faces more (respectively, less) 
competition is more (respectively, less) likely to 
relax its bargaining criteria to reach an agreement. 
Another criterion for relaxation is the relative 
distances between the proposal of an agent and all 
the proposals of its opponents. The general idea is 
that if the best proposal from an agent’s opponent is 
very close to its own proposal relative to all other 
proposals from all other opponents, then it seems 
prudent that an agent should relax its bargaining 
terms and reach a consensus with the opponent with 
the best proposal. The impetus of the work in [17] is 
using an evolutionary procedure for learning 
effective relaxed-criteria negotiation rules that will 
enhance the performance of agents in terms of 
negotiation success rates, utility, and negotiation 
speed. Using the negotiation outcomes (success rates, 
utility, and negotiation speed) of agents in each 
e-market as data sets, at the termination of the 
negotiation process for each e-market, a GA is 
executed to evolve a new set of fuzzy relaxed-criteria 
rules of agents. The new and enhanced set of fuzzy 
rules will be adopted to guide agents in relaxing 
bargaining terms when it negotiates in a new 
e-market, and this process continues as agents 
improve their performance as they negotiate in new 
and different e-markets. This self-improving 
characteristic represents the latest state of 
development in relaxed-criteria negotiation. 
 
Concurrent and Complex Negotiation 
This section reviews complex negotiation in which 
agents conduct concurrent and simultaneous 
negotiation activities, and can potentially be freed 
from intermediate contracts by paying penalty fees. 
Rahwan et al.’s [18] one-to-many negotiation 
model consists of one buyer and multiple sellers, and 
the buyer has a number of sub-negotiators. There are 
multiple negotiation threads, and in each negotiation 
thread, each different sub-negotiator conducts a 
one-to-one negotiation with a different seller.  Four 
strategies were proposed in [18] for controlling and 
coordinating multiple simultaneous one-to-one 
negotiations: 1) Desperate Coordination Strategy 
(DCS), 2) Patient Coordination Strategy (PCS), 3) 
Optimized Patient Coordination Strategy (OPCS), 
and 4) Strategy Manipulation Coordination Strategy 
(SMCS). In DCS, the coordinator agent terminates all 
negotiations once any negotiation thread reaches an 
agreement. In PCS, the coordinator agent waits until 
all sub-negotiators have completed negotiation, then 
chooses the best offer. In OPCS, the coordinator uses 
the negotiation outcome from a negotiation thread to 
influence the performance of other negotiation 
threads. For example (see [18, p. 201]), if one 
sub-negotiation found a deal with utility 7, then in 
other negotiation threads, any offers with utility 
lower than 7 will be considered unacceptable. In 
SMCS, the coordinator may modify the negotiation 
strategies of different negotiation threads at runtime.  
For instance, if a deal has been secured in one 
negotiation thread, the consumer can adopt a 
“take-it-or-leave-it” strategy in other negotiation 
threads [18, p. 201].  
Ngyuen et al. [19] also proposed a one-to-many 
negotiation model consisting of multiple concurrent 
one-to-one negotiations. Unlike agents in [18], 
agents in [19] adopt the time-dependent 
concession-making strategies in [7]: 1) Conceder 
(quickly conceding to its reservation value), 2) linear 
strategy conceding to its reservation value, and 3) 
Bouleware (maintaining its value until the deadline is 
almost reached, then rapidly conceding to its 
reservation value). [19] introduced more flexibility to 
their concurrent one-to-one negotiation model by 
allowing buyer and seller agents to renege on deals 
(i.e., decommit deals) at the expense of paying 
penalty fees. Whereas [10] proposed leveled 
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commitment contracts for a two-player game, [19] 
extended the work in [10] to concurrent negotiation 
involving one buyer and many sellers, and included 
two additional features: 1) reasoning about when to 
decommit from a contract and 2) determining 
whether a new contract is acceptable by considering 
decommitment thresholds. In [19], the penalty fee is 
dynamically computed as a percentage of the utility 
of the deal and the time when the contract is broken. 
A new contract is acceptable if the utility gained by 
taking the new contract is greater than that of the 
current contract after paying the penalty fee for 
decommitment, and the degree of acceptance is 
above a predefined threshold θ that specifies the 
extent that a buyer agent should accept proposals. A 
buyer agent in [19] adopts either of the two 
commitment management strategies: greedy (θ=0) 
(tends to accept any possible deal) or patient (θ = 0.5) 
(only deals that provide a certain expected utility 
value will be accepted). Additionally, there are two 
types of provider agents in [19]: loyal providers that 
will never renege on contracts and partial providers 
that will possibly renege on contracts.  
Sim et al. [11] proposed a concurrent negotiation 
model consisting of multiple one-to-many 
negotiations. Designed for bolstering Grid resource 
co-allocation, the concurrent negotiation model 
consists of a coordinator which coordinates the 
parallel negotiation activities for acquiring n 
different types of Grid resources in n different 
resource markets. In each resource market, a 
consumer agent negotiates simultaneously with 
multiple resource provider agents for one type of 
Grid resource. Furthermore, both consumer and 
provider agents can be freed from a contract by 
paying penalty fees to their opponents. In negotiating 
for one type of Grid resource in a resource market, 
there is a commitment manager that manages both 
commitments and decommitments of (intermediate) 
contracts. In [11], three classes of commitment 
management strategies (CMSs): {Linear-CMS, 
Conciliatory-CMS, and Conservative-CMS} were 
defined by combining the commitment management 
steps with the time-dependent concession making 
functions in [6]: 1) conservative (maintaining the 
initial price until an agent’s deadline is almost 
reached), 2) conciliatory (conceding rapidly to the 
reserve price), and 3) linear (conceding linearly). In 
[20], Sim et al. adopted an Adaptive-CMS in which 
the commitment management steps were combined 
with an adaptive concession making strategy. An 
agent’s adaptive concession making strategy in [20] 
is derived from its current bargaining position in a 
resource market. For instance, a consumer agent is in 
an advantageous (respectively, a disadvantageous) 
bargaining position if it is negotiating in a resource 
market with more (respectively, fewer) provider 
agents. The coordinator can coordinate the parallel 
negotiation activities in n resource markets using: 1) 
the Utility-oriented Coordination Strategy (UOCS) 
and 2) the Patient Coordination Strategy (PCS). In 
the UOCS, at each negotiation round, the coordinator 
determines whether to terminate the entire concurrent 
negotiation based on the predicted utility changes 
received from every commitment manager for each 
one-to-many negotiation. In the PCS, the coordinator 
terminates all concurrent negotiations when it 
acquires all required resources without considering 
time constraint. In [20], the prediction in the change 
of utilities in the UOCS was enhanced using linear 
regression (the Regression-based Utility-oriented 
Coordination Strategy (RUOCS)). Favorable 
empirical results in [20] show that agents adopting 
the RUOCS achieved the highest final utilities among 
the three coordination strategies (RUOCS, UOCS, 
and PCS).   
 
Conclusion and New Directions 
This paper has discussed the differences between 
conventional negotiation and unconventional 
negotiation and summarized the state-of-the-art 
developments in both relaxed-criteria negotiation, 
and complex and concurrent negotiation.  
Whereas game-theoretic research [2-4] provides 
solution concepts for optimizing agents’ utilities in 
simpler negotiation settings (e.g., one-to-one 
negotiation), relaxed-criteria negotiation offers a 
novel approach in solving much more complex 
negotiation problems using heuristics to improve 
success rates and negotiation speed. Whereas 
researchers in game theory [2-4] provided solution 
concepts for determining equilibrium strategies for 
negotiation, they did not provide techniques for 
computing and finding these equilibrium strategies, 
and [21] has shown that finding the equilibrium 
strategies is NP-hard even in a simple one-to-one 
negotiation setting. Through empirical studies, 
relaxed-criteria negotiation aims at providing an 
alternative means for studying the behaviors of 
negotiation agents in complex environments. 
In conventional negotiation, participants negotiate 
in the same market (i.e., within one market). In 
concurrent negotiation, a participant conducts 
simultaneous and parallel negotiation activities with 
resource providers in multiple e-markets to acquire 
multiple types of resources. Furthermore, in complex 
negotiation, both buyers and sellers can renege on 
(intermediate) contracts by paying penalty fees. In 
conventional negotiation, agents negotiate only in 
one e-market for one product/service, and the 
attributes that may complicate the design of 
negotiation mechanisms include: 1) the number of 
negotiation participants and 2) the number of issues 
involved in negotiation. In complex negotiation 
involving decommitments and parallel negotiation 
activities in multiple e-markets, there are two 
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additional attributes that contribute to the complexity 
in concurrent negotiation: 1) the number of e-markets 
that an agent is involved in and 2) the number of 
times that contracts are breached before negotiation 
terminates.   
New direction: The increasing demand for 
building large-scale complex and distributed systems 
such as Cloud/Grid computing systems accentuates 
the need for complex negotiation mechanisms for 
managing computing resources. Supporting resource 
co-allocation is essential for Grid computing because 
1) computationally intensive applications often 
require more resources than a single computing 
machine can provide, and 2) an application may 
require multiple types of computing capabilities from 
different resource owners [22]. Successfully 
obtaining contracts from multiple resource owners 
for simultaneously accessing several resources is a 
very challenging task given that stakeholders often 
have different requirements. Allocating multiple 
resources in a coordinated fashion across virtual 
organizational boundaries is also a very difficult 
problem (e.g., mapping application workflows 
consisting of interacting components that need to be 
executed in a certain partial order to Grid resources is 
an NP complete problem [23]). One way of solving 
such a hard problem is to use heuristic approaches 
(e.g., relaxed-criteria negotiation). This paper 
suggests that a relaxed-criteria concurrent negotiation 
mechanism may be an appropriate tool for 
facilitating Grid resource co-allocation. In a 
relaxed-criteria concurrent negotiation mechanism, 
1) agents in a Grid resource market follow a 
relaxed-criteria negotiation protocol, and perhaps 
adopt a set of criteria in [15-16] (i.e., failure to 
success ratio, demand factor, utilization level, and 
request factor), for relaxing bargaining terms, and 2) 
coordination of the parallel negotiation activities may 
be achieved by adopting one of the three 
coordination strategies in [11, 20] (RUOCS, UOCS, 
and PCS). 
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